Appr6V&&F67AR08as6266374674: CIAREP188-0809A606300740169-1 REPORT I

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION FROM

FOREIGN DOCUMENTS OR RADIO BROADCASTS CD NO.

25X1A

COUNTRY COMMUNIST CHINA

DATE OF INFORMAT

SUBJECT

INDICATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL VULNERABILITIES

HOW

**PUBLISHED** 

WHERE **PUBLISHED** 

DATE

**PUBLISHED** LANGUAGE

CHANGE TO UNGLASSIFIED PER REGRADING BULLETIN NO.

DATE DIST. 28 NOV 52

NO. OF PAGES

OFO

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE

25X1A

CPW Report No. 46 -- COMMUNIST CHINA

(Oct. 27 - Nov. 2, 1952)

CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY INFORMATION

STATE	X	NAVY		NSRB	DISTRI						
ARMY	X	AIR		FBI						<u> </u>	L

## Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000500740169-1

- 2 -

## SUMMARY

Moscow apparently values highly the role of Sino-Soviet Friendship Month in Russianizing China, and the extent of Moscow guidance during the celebrations is revealed by attention given the arriving Soviet delegation, and Peking instructions that the visitors are to be welcomed, appreciated, and the people are to "hold talks" with them. Moscow was said to be changing broadcast schedules to give more Chinese material during SSF Month, but a check fails to reveal any significant changes.

Russian leadership and superiority in all fields are stressed. Chinese scientists will go to Moscow to learn from Russian scientists; special efforts to teach the Russian language are enumerated; establishment of a special Institute of Russian Studies is announced; and it is claimed that the masses are becoming addicted to Soviet films and books. The "great Stalin" frequently is mentioned in SSF Month comment, while one slogan speaks of the "hardships" of the "unselfish Soviet experts," suggesting Russia as a firm but kindly father with a "this hurts me more than you" attitude in molding the Chinese. Much also is said of Soviet aid, but the only material aid mentioned is a gift of three automobiles, made not to Chinese officials but to the SSFA, suggesting that ties between this organization and Moscow are very close.

Greater Soviet control of Peking propaganda is seen in the transplanting to the Pacific of Moscow's line of British-American conflict and distrust. Although there is no change in war propaganda themes, here also is a tendency to bring in the USSR more directly. Russian newspapers are said to stress exploits of Chinese Volunteers, and Pyongyang statements on Russian aid and leadership are repeated.

A Northeast move to lighten agricultural production taxes suggests that collection of these heavy taxes may offer a problem. Peking concern that the remilitarization of Japan will "undermine the economic livelihood of the people" perhaps should be transferred to the Chinese people.

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2003/10/01: CIA-RDP80-00809A000500740169-1